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The Edge, appropriate for exploring contemporary military operations raises 
issues regarding comparative performance to traditional hierarchal 
configurations. Well-controlled experimental design offers insight about the 
internal workings of the Edge organization with high levels of reliability and 
internal validity.  Leweling and Nissen (2007) reported results of an extension to 
a series of laboratory experiments using the ELICIT multiplayer intelligence 
game. This confirmed that Edge organizations outperform Hierarchy 
organizations in certain tasks, environmental contexts, and performance 
measures. Their findings answer questions and inform future experimentation. In 
particular, complementary research suggests that participants’ tacit knowledge 
and contextual influence modulates those results. If so, then understanding tacit 
knowledge and contextual influence at the physiological level—and linking such 
understanding to individual and team performance—can reveal novel insight into 
how to organize, lead and perform in high-capability organizations (Kalbfleisch et 
al., 2006, 2007, Roberts et al., 2009, Kalbfleisch, in press). In this paper we 
explain the elements necessary to understand and employ during state-of-the-art 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to illuminate such physiological 
bases.  Specifically, neuroimaging can be used to identify neural systems 
affiliated with behavior during meaningful moments of exchange to characterize 
tacit knowledge during ELICIT. Building upon previous work, this research 
















The Edge (Alberts and Hayes, 2003) represents a fresh approach to 
organizational design, one that is particularly powerful in the context of modern 
military operations; it capitalizes upon fully connected, geographically distributed, 
organizational participants by moving knowledge and power to the edges of 
organizations where they interact directly with their environments.  Indeed, the 
Edge raises issues regarding comparative performance of individuals when 
performing within traditional hierarchical organizational configurations or others 
that function within alternative structures (Gateau et al., 2007). Well-controlled 
experimental design offers insight about the internal workings of the Edge 
organization with high levels of reliability and internal validity.  Leweling and 
Nissen (2007) reported results of an extension to a series of laboratory 
experiments using the ELICIT (Experimental Laboratory for Investigating 
Collaboration, Information Sharing, and Trust) multiplayer counterterrorism 
intelligence game. This confirmed that Edge organizations outperform Hierarchy 
organizations in certain tasks, environmental contexts, and performance 
measures. In particular, complementary research suggests that participants’ tacit 
knowledge and contextual influence on their reasoning may strongly affect such 
results. If so, then understanding people’s tacit knowledge and contextual 
influences on their reasoning at the physiological level—and linking such 
understanding to individual and team performance—reveals novel insight into 
how to organize, lead and perform in high-capability organizations (Kalbfleisch et 
al., 2007, Kalbfleisch, in press). 
In this paper we review some approaches to consider for experimental design 
examining how the environment changes neural systems of reasoning and how 
social interaction influences tacit knowledge and its influence on the formation of 
trust during ELICIT.  Specifically, monitoring the neural basis of interoception, 
social awareness, and reasoning will permit a physiological understanding of 
behavior during meaningful moments of exchange.  This research opens new 
avenues for the epistemological understanding of formal and informal dynamic 
influences on decision-making and trust during social interaction. 
 
ELICITing Behavior 
ELICIT is designed to explore social and cognitive impacts of the C2 approach 
within the context of organizational structures and situations such as information 
sharing, trust, shared awareness, and task performance.  It consists of multiple 
features that permit flexibility in altering environmental context and supports 
social context between two individuals and also with software agents. Concretely, 
it involves players in a situational awareness task whose goal is the find the who, 
what, where, and when of a future terrorist attack.  Information is distributed to 
multiple participants over time and no one participant will have all of the 
information needed to solve the problem. Dependent variables are things such as  
 
roles, responsibilities, and controlled access between and to other players (see 
Figure 1).  Measures of effectiveness that lend themselves to behavioral 
characterization for neuroimaging experimentation fall under the headings 
Quality and Efficiency (see Table 1). 
 
Quality of Awareness & Shared 
Awareness 
Efficiency 
Correctness (Authorized IDs) Productivity (Total Correct Actions/ 
Time Stamp) 
Timeliness (Minutes to Correct IDs) Speed (Time of Earliest Correct ID) 
Accuracy (Correct IDs & Total IDs)  
Table 1. ELICIT Effectiveness Indices                                        
With these parameters, it is possible to synthesize the methodologies of ELICIT 
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), correlating signal in imaging 
data to vectors tied to reaction time, response, and temporal contiguity, to 
approximate the neural systems that support key moments of choice and 
exchange during individual and social problem-solving.  In doing so, there are 
important and necessary controls to apply to this examination that involve several 
layers of neural activity: (1) an account of a person’s own self-awareness in the 
game experience, (2) their cognitive processes of reasoning, and (3) the 
modulation of uncertainty that primes the experience.  Accounting for these 
variables sets the stage for the greatest resolution of knowledge construction 
processes (internal and social) that occur during ELICIT. The following section 
reasons for and outlines these constructs and discusses methodological issues 
associated with their accounting.  Said succinctly, trust is not only a choice or the 
result of an intuitive or more intentional assessment, but a composite of other 
more basic processes occurring at a systemic level (as in Figure 1) and a 
physiological level.  The next section outlines physiological requirements for 
exploring ELICIT dynamics. 
                      
 














Physiological Constructs Supporting the Assessment of Choice and Trust 
During ELICIT 
Interoception 
Studies of game interaction require an account for the influence of interoception, 
one’s sense of the physiological condition of the body (Cameron and Minoshima, 
2002; Longo et al., 2010) typically represented by activity in the right anterior 
insular cortex (Craig, 2003).  When considering the role of context, an obvious 
but difficult relationship to characterize is the boundary between one’s awareness 
of themselves and the impact of the social environment?  To illustrate, it is known 
that emotions are associated with patterns of cardiorespiratory activity as 
measured by electrocardiogram (Rainville et al., 2006) and other studies of 
biofeedback and the autonomic nervous system.  Another situation that rivals 
examining the complexity of social interactions and situated problem solving is 
the creative process.  For instance, neurologist Kenneth Heilman and colleagues 
(2003) suggest that creative people, in addition to possessing a deep store of 
domain knowledge and the intellectual resources to mine it, may also have an 
ability to modulate their hormonal systems.  They posit that because creativity is 
associated with low levels of arousal, sometimes called “flow” (Dietrich, 2004), 
that the ability to modulate the adrenalin system may be an additional enabling 
factor to influencing creative production.   
 
They tested this hypothesis in a population of individuals who had been 
implanted with vagus nerve stimulators for treatment of intractable seizures 
(Ghacibeh et al., 2006).  The vagus nerve is a cranial nerve (X) that serves as 
the main conduit between the body and the brain and its transmission of 
adrenaline.  The vagus nerve travels from the gut and heart in the periphery 
through the solitary tract nucleus in the brainstem and up to the locus coeruleus, 
the part of cortex which holds the limbic system, an area heavily modulated by 
adrenalin.  During stimulation of this nerve, Heilman and colleagues found that 
learning and retention were enhanced, while performance on measures of 
cognitive flexibility and creativity were impaired.  They discuss the relationship 
between arousal and cognition lending insight into the dose response curve 
associated with subjective and objective forms of stress, a key variable in the 
ability to express talent (Kalbfleisch, 2009). This type of emotion regulation and 
how it organizes for successful goal-directed behavior is also suggested in the 
child development literature (Hoeksma et al., 2004) pointing to the fact that our 
nervous systems regulate cognition on simultaneous and multiple levels just as it 
does basic autonomic processes, and that the two are more closely entrained 
than we presently appreciate. Contemporary cognitive neuroscience presents a 
revised understanding of the posteromedial cortex (consisting of Brodmann 
areas 23, 29, 30, 31, and 7m) as a regional area that actively assesses 
interoceptive and state-related information (Parvizi et al., 2006) beyond 
examining basic systems of arousal.  Separating the influences of task demand 
and the participant’s sense of self in relationship to their progress or experience 
during ELICIT can illustrate how emotion regulation may relate to the formation of 
tacit knowledge and how it may be trained (Critchley et al., 2002).  Furthermore, 
in regards to the “flow” state affiliated with discussions about creativity, leads me 
to consider the cognitive states of game participation.  One could argue that 
players in game situations are also engaged in a state of flow entrained by the 
game environment itself.   
 
Social Awareness 
This section draws primarily from the chapter by Edward Hutchins on social 
learning processes during ship navigation (1996) where he draws heavily from 
writings of Lev Vygotsky to map out and in between the development of 
navigation skills and the designed spaces that facilitate that acquisition during 
social interaction.  In this chapter he quotes heavily from Vygotsky (1960, 1981) 
who says, “Any higher mental function necessarily goes through an external 
stage in its development because it is initially a social function.  This is the center 
of the whole problem of internal and external behavior…. When we speak of a 
process, ‘external’ means ‘social.’ Any higher mental function was external 
because it was social at some point before becoming an internal, truly mental 
function.  It was first a social relation between two people” (p.162). 
Drawing from that inspiration, Hutchins posits: 
“That leads one to wonder whether there might be intrapsychological processes 
that could not be transformations of processes that occurred in social interaction.  
Finding such a process would be a challenge to Vygotsky’s position, but unless 
there are constraints on the possible transformations, then there is no way to 
identify such a process” (p. 61). 
An a priori design to monitor aspects of interoception and social awareness 
provides the ability to triangulate more than just the cognitive processes affiliated 
with problem solving during ELICIT.  There is a long precedent in the 
developmental psychology literature for triangulating the relationship and 
interaction between cognitive processes and the processes of social interaction 
(Musatti, 1993), taking into account what Vygotsky (1960) referred to as the 
cultural structure of the environment and that it is “instrumentally created” when 
systems of meanings become apparent to the child and they become practiced at 
identifying and interacting with relevant information from their environment 
(Wertsch and Rupert, 1993).  Precedent for observing this now comes from 
emerging studies examining neural systems that monitor one’s perception of 
themselves in space (Macaluso and Maravita, 2010) and in a virtual world 
(Baumgartner et al., 2008). fMRI, on a physical level, is a socially isolating 
experience. Drawing from this, ELICIT creates its own contingencies that define 
the goal and establishes the cultural structure around the interaction, decreasing 
the degrees of freedom one has to account for in characterizing the acquisition 




Another useful analogy to draw from Hutchins’ chapter on ship navigation (1996) 
is that of the ‘fix cycle’ relating to the maintenance functions of a ship (p.43).  He 
makes the point that this cycle can run at a more leisurely pace of 30-minute 
intervals or it can be accelerated to run at one-minute intervals when the ship is 
in restricted waters.  It is the same with the brain.  The brain reasons on many 
levels.  We typically equate reasoning with decisions and choices made under 
conditions where we have all the information needed to make a choice but not a 
lot of time (Kalbfleisch et al., 2006, 2007) or, all the time we need but struggle to 
gain all the relevant information and have to approximate and take a risk.  Again, 
ELICIT’s parameters maneuver along those axes as evidenced by the explicit 
behavioral measures and the landscape laid out for its participants in either 
hierarchical or edge configurations.  The beauty of the brain is that it has multiple 
systems to draw from that enable us to reason (Goel and Dolan, 2003, Hynes et 
al., 2006, van den Bos et al., 2007), some that are affiliated with the feeling of 
making a distinct choice and others that provide a perceptual assist when 
variables of a decision become perceptually or explicitly complex (Christoff et al., 
2002; Kroger et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2008, Stoneham et al., 2008; Roberts et 
al., 2009; Halavi et al., in submission).  Knowing this, it approaches the realm of 
possibility that there are additional subtleties of higher-level cognition instantiated 
in neural tissue that we haven’t seen yet.   
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigms in cognitive 
neuroscience have historically documented basic building blocks of human 
cognition (visual perception, attention, memory) apart from decision-making.  
More recently, the field has jumped to naturalistic paradigms (social affective 
phenomenon, neuroeconomics, theory of mind), some of which lack the 
experimental controls that permit an accurate interpretation and contextual 
understanding of their studied phenomenon (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009), and 
others that require such complex signal processing outside of standardized 
image analysis protocols, that assessing the validity of the result becomes quite 
difficult.  To that end, a layperson trying to understand basic principles and 
guideposts would benefit from knowing that some have compiled neuroprimers to 
assist in the application and interpretation of neuroimaging work in cognitive and 
social paradigms (Cacioppo et al., 2003; Kalbfleisch, 2008). Some fMRI 
paradigms appear more to fit the “brain to the game” rather than the other way 
around.  In particular, investigations of the relationship between emotion and 
cognition report findings in dichotomies that suggest that emotion and cognition 
happen aside each other (Pessoa, 2008).  This draws particular concern for our 
understanding of reasoning, the most summative functional cognitive outcome.  
The current state of the discussion about implicit priming of cognition, one way to 
characterize how emotion and environmental context shape cognition, is defined 
by experiments that have taken a classical conditioning approach to demonstrate 
modulation on activity in primary visual cortex when pairing emotion-laden 
images with a shock (Padmala and Pessoa, 2008) or a masked priming 
approach that demonstrates modulation for responses to financial reward and 
punishment (Pessiglione et al., 2008).  While these are valuable contributions to 
our knowledge of how cognition is modulated by sensation, emotion and 
incentive, an encompassing strategy is still needed to characterize a prescriptive 
understanding of how environmental context modulates performance under a 
wider array of conditions and incentives than has been previously documented. 
In the face of emerging data that the brain calculates its own moves under 
conditions of uncertainty (Kalbfleisch et al., 2006, 2007) and much earlier than 
the moment of the behavioral response (Eichele et al., 2008), that we believe we 
can assess one’s action intention (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006), and still 
characterize what we would say is volitional action (Kalbfleisch, 2004, Haggard, 
2008), it is even more important to understand how neural systems of reasoning 
are executed differently in varying emotional contexts.  Thus, the capability to 
document ELICIT is built on an understanding of the influences outlined here and 
an ability to use this information as a tool for experimental design. 
 
                              ELICIT and the Neuroscience of Gaming 
Investigations of the neural underpinnings of gaming have focused on the neural 
systems of executing the game and significant improvements in those systems or 
changes in performance (Green & Bavelier, 2003; Thorell et al., 2009).  No 
studies have been able to directly correlate structural change with meaningful 
functional change in brain activity (Haier et al., 2009). Many of these studies are 
called into question because of weaknesses in experimental design such as 
players logging into a site to play for a certain amount of time, not enough time 
spent on task, or difficulty in enforcing participation compliance.   
 
Some papers report findings related to the state(s) of awareness of the players, 
but the main focus is still what is going on in the game context and the impact 
that distractors have on keeping a game player in flow (Wentura et al., 2009) or 
using the game to suppress other mental activity (Holmes et al., 2009). The 
closest comparison to addressing a state effect we could find outside of 
documentation of studies of augmented cognition for military use (Kalbfleisch and 
Forsythe, in press) is one study which demonstrated that visual images of the 
game Tetris persisted while they were trying to fall asleep and that those images 
may assist or, more neutrally, are present during the re-organization and 
consolidation of the procedural skills tied to playing the game (Stickgold et al., 
2000).  
 
While the branches of behaviorist, cognitive, humanist, and social psychology, 
are all fields, they are also all discrete aspects of a larger network of ways that 
learning occurs.  Behaviorism marks the beginning of the sense-making process 
when the environment or ideas being encountered are unfamiliar to the learner.  
It helps build access to an association that will have the potential to be 
meaningfully integrated as the participant makes sense of new information.  We 
can, in part, recognize this integration in someone’s “natural”, appropriate, 
effective behavior that can be likened to tacit knowledge.  This is the basis of the 
approach to examine ELICIT processes during neuroimaging.  The surface 
assumption is that we will document the moment of trust and, henceforth, refer to 
trust as if it is a crystallized object.  When, in reality, trust is a process and a 
state, a noun and a verb.  Thus, taking the ELICIT platform into virtual and 
physiological experimental paradigms provides the opportunity for examining any 
number of “nouns” and “verbs” important to our understanding of social cognition 
and context-dependent decision-making.  In this paper, we have attempted to 
outline the layers of knowledge and understanding that will permit an optimal 
look. 
 
With the knowledge that well-controlled experimental design offers insight about 
the internal workings of the Edge organization with high levels of reliability and 
internal validity in the ELICIT multiplayer counterterrorism intelligence game 
(Leweling & Nissen, 2007), we can take this game into a neurophysiological 
experimental design. Knowing that Edge organizations outperform Hierarchy 
organizations in certain tasks, environmental contexts, and performance 
measures and that participants’ tacit knowledge and contextual influence on their 
reasoning may strongly affect such results offers behavioral data significant 
enough to be explored during neuroimaging.  Understanding people’s tacit 
knowledge and contextual influences on their reasoning at the physiological level 
during ELICIT—and linking such understanding to individual and team 
performance—will reveal novel insight into how to organize, lead and perform in 
high-capability organizations (Kalbfleisch et al., 2006, 2007, Roberts et al., 2009; 
Kalbfleisch, in press). 
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